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In September 2009, we hosted an unusual workshop at Duke Law School. The 
workshop focused on the empirical evaluation of judges, judging, and judicial 
institutions. Most work in this area has been driven by the agendas and constraints of 
empirical researchers, and empiricists from multiple disciplines—including history, 
sociology, anthropology, political science, and law and economics—participated in the 
workshop. But they were joined by judges and legal theorists, who were invited to take 
the lead in selecting the specific issues to be discussed at the workshop. The reason for 
the workshop’s unusual makeup and structure was our conviction that the empirical 
analysis of judging can be dramatically strengthened through the active participation of 
judges and theorists. In this Essay, we explain why we think conversations among these 
three groups are important. Then, drawing on the workshop experience, we describe 
where and how we believe that cooperation could do the most to advance the empirical 
study of the judiciary, with special attention to issues of evaluation. 
 
Before beginning, we should note that we paint with a broad brush here and likely 
fail to give credit where it is due. This Essay should be read as a comment on general 
tendencies rather than on individual studies or people. To the extent that it can be 
understood as reflecting on individuals, we are not ourselves exempt from the criticisms. 
 
I. GOALS OF THE WORKSHOP 
  
The empirical analysis of judicial behavior is one of the fastest growing areas of 
scholarship in the legal academy. The three of us bring different perspectives to this 
literature. Two of us, a legal scholar and a political scientist, have been involved in 
producing portions of that empirical literature. The third, a former federal prosecutor and 
United States District Judge and currently a law school dean, has been sometimes a critic 
but also a proponent. Disagreements among us are intense, with each at times finding the 
others’ perspectives on courts and judges perplexing and frustrating, if not utterly 
misguided. Yet our debates have resulted in agreement on three important points: the 
emergence of this literature in legal academia is something to be celebrated, its potential 
has not yet been realized, and its potential would be realized more quickly if judges and 
legal theorists played a larger role in producing it. 
 
 One reason to celebrate the growth of this literature is the increased interaction 
between legal scholars and social scientists. Despite much disagreement between social 
scientists and legal academics on the how and why of studying judges, a number of 
scholars from each side have begun talking and working together, realizing that they can 
gain both new insights from each other and bigger audiences for their work. Because of 
the research experience and methodological expertise that social scientists bring to this 
partnership, the resulting body of work is likely to be more rigorous and reliable than if it 
were produced by legal scholars alone. 
 
 But this collaboration also brings dangers—in particular, that methodological 
considerations will dominate theory rather than serve it, resulting in research that is 
hyper-technical and theoretically narrow or even irrelevant. If this happens, the research 
will be of little utility or interest to those who should care most about it, including the 
primary subjects of the literature: judges and those who depend most upon our judicial 
institutions. Further, neither judges nor scholars with training in other disciplines will be 
able to engage and be involved in the research project if it takes such a technical turn.  
 
To our eyes, there are already disturbing signs of a trend in this direction. 
Specifically, in its themes and methodological approaches, the emerging empirical 
research in the legal academy tends to resemble the work that social scientists were 
already doing. Part of the cause, we think, is that legal academics and judges have been 
too reticent about the strengths they bring to empirical research and therefore have not 
pushed as hard as they might for work to move in new directions. Or perhaps it is that 
social scientists have been too aggressive in pushing their own perspectives, sometimes 
in a framework that is seen by judges as attacking them or mocking their aspirations. 
Either way, we do not think this trend best serves any of the groups involved. 
 
There is a different direction available, one in which the collaboration between 
legal scholars and social scientists expands to incorporate more perspectives, particularly 
those of the primary research subjects, and becomes more accessible, interesting, and 
relevant. Perhaps another way to think of this approach, congenial to law professors, is to 
think of the judges and the judiciaries as if they were clients and not subjects. 
 
A skeptic might correctly point out that our goals here cut against the dominant 
paradigm in empirical research across a range of disciplines, in which social scientists 
study phenomena from an outsider’s perspective. They observe and measure and theorize 
about their research subjects, but do not necessarily feel any need to interact with them; 
and certainly not as collaborators. We are overstating, of course. Our colleagues in 
anthropology and sociology, especially, incorporate the subject-perspective into their 
research. But their work has not figured prominently in the current enthusiasm in 
American law schools for empirical research on courts. We hope that in the future 
judges’ perspectives will play an increasing role in the research on courts.  
 
There is a different reason for our push toward increased collaboration between 
researchers and their subjects and that has to do with our goals. These goals are at least 
partially normative. We hope that the research can have payoffs in the near future in 
terms of yielding insights into how to improve the functioning of the judicial system. The 
three of us believe that the quality of the judicial system is important as a social and as an 
economic matter, and that aspects of the system can be measured and studied to help 
determine whether it can be improved and how. By contrast, there are others who are 
skeptical of the measurement project itself—arguing that no measurement is better than 
partial measurement.1 The threshold questions, then, are what should be measured and 
how. 
II. WHAT TO MEASURE AND WHY 
  
The questions for our workshop—what does it mean to judge well, how well do 
judges perform, and how can judicial institutions be arranged to promote the best possible 
performance?—are examples of topics that could benefit from greater intellectual cross-
fertilization. Like all public officials entrusted with substantial power, judges should be 
subjected to critical appraisal: holding them accountable for their performance, 
identifying judges worthy of promotion, helping to decide who is fit to be a judge in the 
first place, or reforming judicial institutions to promote better judging. Judges 
themselves, in our experience, are interested in the question of what makes a good judge 
and, in many cases, would welcome research that attempted to tackle that question, 
particularly when the outcome of that research might be concrete suggestions for better 
judicial techniques or institutional arrangements. We are hardly making radical 
statements here; evaluative statements about judges and judging are far from rare. Indeed, 
we have colleagues who, although hostile toward any attempt to quantify aspects of 
judicial behavior, are comfortable evaluating the quality of this or that judge based on a 
selection of noteworthy opinions. 
 
 The challenge we confront, for which we would welcome help from judges and 
theorists, is in identifying evaluative standards that are widely held, firmly grounded in 
theory, and amenable to rigorous empirical assessment. If we were to ask observers of 
courts about judicial performance, we might well reveal some consensus about how well 
judges do in general and even about which judges stand out as particularly strong or 
weak. But if we were to press our respondents to explain the grounds for their judgments, 
we suspect that the answers would differ, with many struggling to give an explanation or 
even define their terms. 
 
If we are correct that there is room for improvement in the critical evaluation of 
judging, the main reason is not that judges and scholars have been uninterested in the 
topic. It is not uncommon for judges to share their thoughts about proper judging in 
print,2 and one of us can attest that many judges who do not write on the topic still 
contemplate it privately and with colleagues. There also have been a handful of judges 
who have engaged the academic debates primarily to criticize academic attempts to 
                                                            
1  See, e.g., Marin K. Levy, Kate Stith & José A. Cabranes, The Costs of Judging 
Judges by the Numbers, LEGAL WORKSHOP, (DUKE L.J., Feb. 25, 2010); William P. 
Marshall, Be Careful What You Wish for: The Problems with Using Empirical Rankings 
to Select Supreme Court Justices, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 119, 134 (2004) (“[P]lacing too 
much emphasis on quantifiable measures alone may . . . inhibit the selection of those with 
the qualities most needed for a successful Supreme Court tenure.”). 
2  E.g., Armistead M. Dobie, A Judge Judges Judges, 1951 WASH. U. L.Q. 471, 
474–84; Ruggero J. Aldisert et al., What Makes a Good Appellate Judge? Four Views, 
JUDGES’ J., Summer 1983, at 14, 14, 16–17; Joseph P. Nadeau, What It Means to Be a 
Judge, JUDGES’ J., Summer 2000, at 34, 34–35. 
measure judicial behavior through empirical study.3 Despite the apparent hostility of 
some judges, our impression from both reading and observation at our workshop is that 
the tone of their critiques is driven less by hostility to the idea that judicial behavior can 
be evaluated (and that there are better and worse performing judges and courts) than by 
the perception that academics are aiming wide of the mark in terms of conducting the 
type of research that might help improve the judicial system.4  
 
On the academic side, there is some work directly on the question of how to 
evaluate judging—including Solum’s (2003) theoretical exploration5 and Cann’s (2007) 
empirical analyses.6 Empirical studies of judges and courts have become more common, 
and many of these studies implicitly adopt some view of judging. Concerns about the 
quality of judging are an important motivator of recent research into heuristics and biases 
in judging.7 And even if they often go unexpressed, normative considerations about the 
legitimacy of judges’ behavior underlie the question that has garnered more attention 
                                                            
3  E.g., Harry T. Edwards, Essay, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. 
Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1364–70 (1998); Bruce M. Selya, Pulling from the Ranks? 
Remarks on the Proposed Use of an Objective Judicial Ranking System to Guide the 
Supreme Court Appointment Process, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1281, 1281–83 (2005); 
Laura Denvir Stith, Response, Just Because You Can Measure Something, Does It Really 
Count?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1743, 1743–45 (2009). 
4  Further, it seems that judges perceive a tone of disrespect in some of the 
academic work that seeks to rank judges on simple measures and reveal the secret 
“political” agendas of judges. David F. Levi & Mitu Gulati, “Only Connect”: Toward a 
Unified Measurement Project, 58 DUKE L.J. 1181, 1183 (2009) (“Judges . . . resent what 
they see as the obsession of some empiricists with proving that judges determine case 
outcomes based on their judicial philosophies, which the political scientists insist on 
calling ‘political bias.’”); Ernest A. Young & Erin C. Blondel, Response, Does the 
Supreme Court Follow the Economic Returns? A Response to a Macrotheory of the 
Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 1759, 1782 (2009) (“[M]any empiricists . . . seem to default to less 
plausible explanations for judicial behavior—for example, that judges are voting their 
political viewpoints or trying to affect the economy. These conclusions 
seem . . . inaccurate—even offensive—to judges.”). 
5  Lawrence Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 
34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178, 198–99 (2003) (“[J]udicial virtues 
include . . . temperance, courage, good temper, intelligence, wisdom, and 
justice. . . . Judges ought to be selected on the basis of their possession of . . . the judicial 
virtues.” (footnote omitted)). 
6  Damon Cann, Beyond Accountability and Independence: Judicial Selection and 
State Court Performance, 90 JUDICATURE 226, 229 (2007) (basing an empirical study 
of merit selection efficacy on a survey of 2,428 state court judges who chose “‘making 
impartial decisions,’ ‘ensuring fairness under law,’ ‘defending constitutional rights and 
freedoms,’ and ‘providing equal justice for rich and poor’” as the “most important” 
judicial duties). 
7  E.g., Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the 
Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (2007). 
from students of judicial behavior than any other: the extent to which judges’ personal 
policy preferences or moral views trump impartial interpretations of legal materials in 
determining their decisions. Outside of empirical studies, one may see the same implicit 
evaluation issues in certain theoretical work, such as in the literature on constitutional 
interpretation. 
 
 Lack of attention, then, is not a major obstacle to progress in the study of judicial 
performance. In our view, a far more important obstacle is the dearth of intellectual 
engagement among judges, theorists, and empiricists. The result is empirical work that is 
often too far removed from the core concerns of theorists and judges to reward their 
attention and theoretical work that is typically too abstract to lend itself to empirical 
testing.  
 
Research into ideological voting illustrates this problem. Empirical scholars have 
amassed mountains of evidence suggesting that ideology plays an important role in 
judicial decisions, especially at the United States Supreme Court. But this evidence seems 
to have had only a limited impact on the way most theorists and judges think. Empiricists 
are often frustrated by what seems like a stubborn refusal to confront the implications of 
their findings, but there may be more to the reactions than obstinacy. For example, it may 
be that the distinction between the “legal” and “attitudinal” models does not capture all, 
or even a large part, of what is important for the legitimacy of judicial decisions.  
 
 If we are right to claim that there is a problem, what can be done about it? At a 
general level, the crucial step is for judges, theorists, and empiricists to engage in 
structured conversations. Workshops like ours can help foster such conversations, and we 
hope to hold more of them. Larger conferences, such as those sponsored by the Society 
for Empirical Legal Studies, may also serve this purpose. In the end, however, there is no 
substitute for reading each other’s writings. There have been signs of cross-disciplinary 
awareness in recent years. For instance, Judge Posner, who has always engaged the social 
science literature, is especially attentive to it in his latest book on judging;8 and two 
recent books by theorists include extensive discussions of social science research.9 Yet 
these authors are in a small minority. On the other side, many empiricists care about 
theoretical issues; in fact, as noted, the much-maligned attitudinal versus legal model 
debate is, at bottom, about the legitimacy of judges’ behavior and self-presentation. Still, 
caring about theoretical issues is not quite the same as reading theorists and judges 
closely and designing studies specifically to test their ideas or address their concerns.  
 
Of course, writers cannot place all the blame on readers. Empiricists might boost 
readership among judges and theorists by: a) explaining their methods and results in ways 
that are clear and unintimidating even to those without much training in empirical 
research or statistics; b) avoiding resting their analyses on assumptions that strike others 
                                                            
8  RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008). 
9  MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT (2008); BRIAN Z. 
TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF 
POLITICS IN JUDGING (2008). 
as too unrealistic to take seriously; c) making the theoretical and practical implications of 
their research more explicit; and d) increasing their understanding of the law or legal 
framework so as to avoid making inaccurate statements or assertions. Perhaps most 
beneficial would be a greater focus in the first place on questions that judges and theorists 
could be expected to care about. For instance, in choosing criteria for evaluating judges 
or judicial institutions, they could pay close attention to the normative arguments of 
theorists and the practicalities of real life judging, the latter with an eye toward what we 
can reasonably demand of human judges or what they can reasonably hope to achieve. 
 
Like empiricists, theorists and judges are more likely to attract readers outside 
their own circles to the extent they refrain from insularity, eschew jargon, and avoid 
assumptions of knowledge or beliefs not shared by those outside the circle—admittedly, 
easier said than done. Most importantly, in thinking about their own work, whether 
academic or on the bench, theorists and judges could try to be more aware of when that 
work raises questions about the empirical world or rests on assumptions about the 
empirical world that are questionable. Identifying such questions could make it more 
obvious to empiricists why they should read what theorists and judges write.  
 
The benefits of having theorists and judges suggest topics for empirical analysis 
would not end there. Many empiricists would likely find studying the suggested topics 
intellectually rewarding. Their work would, in turn, be read by more judges and theorists. 
The result, we suspect, would be a virtuous circle, with ever-increasing engagement 
among the different groups. 
 
III. THE NEXT STAGE 
 
Our workshop experiences and impressions from reading tell us that suggesting 
questions for empirical analysis does not come easily to judges and theorists, perhaps 
because of reticence, skepticism, or certain habits of thinking. And empiricists are not 
especially inclined to listen to either theorists or research subjects about what they should 
be studying and how. That said, despite some apparent distrust or misunderstanding at the 
initial stages, there was ultimately a high level of intellectual engagement at the 
workshop. Whatever the causes for the initial difficulties in getting the conversations 
going, we hope theorists and judges will push to play a larger role in setting the empirical 
research agenda, whether through calls for action or, if they wish to be more directly 
involved, through active collaboration with empirical researchers. 
 
We end with four sets of more specific suggestions (or pleas) to different 
combinations of key players. The first, to academics—both theoretical and empirical—is 
to consider spreading their attention more evenly across a broad range of courts and 
judicial behaviors. The law touches people’s lives far more often and directly through 
state trial courts than through federal appellate courts. And then there are the local courts 
tackling small claims, traffic violations, and family matters; the administrative law 
tribunals; the international law courts; and similar court systems. All of these settings 
potentially provide rich sources of insight into the workings of legal institutions. Some of 
these settings have been examined by researchers, but these examinations are relatively 
rare and are frequently ignored in mainstream discussions of judges and courts.  
 
As important as decisions on the merits of cases are, it is just as important for us 
to understand how judges gather information, evaluate evidence, interpret precedents, 
rule on motions, choose language for their opinions, and so on. Further, whether in the 
criminal or civil justice systems, most parties’ experience of the courts is not the 
traditional trial or a series of opinions culminating in the Supreme Court of the 
jurisdiction. Rather, it is a settlement system, through plea bargain or negotiation. But 
these truths, although reflected in many individual studies, are not well reflected in the 
literature as a whole, especially in political science and legal theory. Of course, we are 
not advocating that scholars stop paying attention to the U.S. Supreme Court and federal 
appellate decisions. Those who wish to reach judges and produce research with wider 
application to the world outside of academia, however, might achieve more success by 
focusing more on the issues of most concern to the typical judge and the typical litigant 
on a typical day. 
 
The second suggestion, to empiricists alone, is to consider embracing greater 
methodological flexibility. Both theorists and judges at our workshop seemed impatient 
with what they viewed as empirical researchers’ insistence on quantification, usually in 
the context of large-sample studies. Their criticism is overstated, given the large number 
of empirical researchers who employ qualitative techniques. Nevertheless, it has some 
validity both for the literature as a whole and for the emerging branch of that literature in 
legal journals. By no means do we think it would be appropriate for empiricists to 
weaken their standards in a way that would allow conclusions to be drawn from data that 
do not adequately support them. But, as long as they explicitly recognize limitations in 
their data, it seems to us that it may be worthwhile to sacrifice some reliability10 and 
precision if it allows them to get at things that really matter.  
 
Our third plea is to theorists and judges. They were no more shy about expressing 
criticisms of empirical work at our workshop than they have been in print. But their 
criticisms are seldom as constructive as they might be. It is of some help to an empirical 
researcher to hear why a particular method of measuring a key concept is flawed; it is far 
better to receive suggestions for improving the method. Is there any way of assessing the 
                                                            
10  To illustrate, Professors Gulati and Klein have collaborated on research 
employing types of citation counts to measure aspects of judicial reputation and 
performance. E.g., Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Judicial Evaluations 
and Information Forcing: Ranking State High Courts and Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1313 
(2009); David E. Klein & Darby Morrisroe, Prestige and Influence on the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1998). Because the computation of these measures 
does not require independent judgment, they are highly reliable. On the other hand, 
although we believe that the measures are also valid, we readily concede that they only 
partially capture the phenomena of interest and could usefully be supplemented by 
measures that approach the phenomena from other angles, even if dependent on greater 
coder judgment and so more susceptible to reliability problems. 
concept, even if imperfect, that would yield useful information? If not, is there a similar 
concept that could be empirically observed, allowing at least some light to be shed on the 
question? The key here, we think, is patience—for theorists and judges to recognize that a 
methodological difficulty is not necessarily an impossibility and, instead of dismissing 
the problem, to contribute their insights in an attempt to solve it. 
 
Finally, a request of judges. One of the most important things they could do to 
promote empirical scholarship that is significant and that matters to them is to actively 
embrace the spirit of scholarly inquiry. No one much enjoys being the focus of critical 
scrutiny, especially when being evaluated by measures that seem crude. (Consider how 
academics regard student evaluations of their teaching or their dean’s annual 
determination of whether they have “contributed” or not). But to the extent judges can 
overcome discomfort or resentment, cooperate with researchers’ efforts to study them, 
and suggest ways for researchers to improve their studies, they can significantly 
contribute to the research enterprise. And there is no reason why judges should only be 
subjects of research. They can also engage in research informally or formally, whether 
keeping their eyes open for how things are done in other courts and comparing those 
methods with their own, engaging in experimentation to test the effectiveness of different 
practices or institutions, or even conducting full-scale studies and publishing the results. 
We recognize that in the current political environment there are groups and persons who 
seek to damage the judiciary in general and individual judges in particular. From our 
point of view, this is lamentable. But these malevolent forces and special interests will 
gather and publicize their own flawed data and empirical studies. We ask the judges to 
consider that more and better empirical study of judging and judicial institutions has the 
potential to lead to a stronger judiciary and to better judging. It is also an antidote to 
slanted and partisan attacks disguised as objective studies.  
 
At the end of the day, we realize we are asking for a lot and that others might not 
be as optimistic regarding the value of collaboration among judges, theorists, and 
empiricists. What we saw at the workshop itself was a great deal of openness and 
willingness to engage. Given what we saw, we are certainly willing to do whatever we 
can to keep the conversations going. 
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